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Abstract   In this paper, I investigate aquaculture externalities on fisheries, af-
fecting either habitat, wild fish stock genetics, or fishing efficiency under
open-access and rent-maximising fisheries. This is done with a Verhulst-
Schaefer model of fish population-dynamics and production, coupled with a
simple aquaculture production model. Externalities are modelled by letting car-
rying capacity, the stock’s intrinsic growth rate, or catchability coefficient in the
fishery depend on aquaculture production. The different externalities can give
totally opposite results on steady-state fishing effort, yield, and stock, even for
only negative externalities. With a catchability externality, increased unit cost of
fishing effort implies reduced aquaculture production to maximise benefits to
society under reasonable assumptions. Resource allocation between the indus-
tries is analysed under three different coastal management regimes: 1)
aquaculture has a primary right of use; 2) joint management of aquaculture and
fishery; 3) fishers have a primary right of use, including the right to sell marine
farming rights.
Key words   Aquaculture, fisheries, externality, interactions, carrying capacity,
intrinsic growth rate, catchability coefficient, habitat, genetics.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, R52.
Introduction
There is increasing rivalry for coastal resources (Buanes et al. 2004). In some cases
the rivalry is for access to the same resource; in others it is to avoid negative exter-
nalities from others’ use of resources. Understanding how different users and uses
might affect each other is obviously important, as well as how different coastal man-
agement regimes can influence this. Aquaculture and fisheries are important
industries in many coastal areas, and conflicts between them are not uncommon
(Dwire 1996; Grey and Sullivan 2003; Anon. 2002; Murai 1992). In this paper, I
consider the use and management of coastal areas when there are external effects of
aquaculture on fisheries.
Over the last 40–50 years, marine aquaculture has grown steadily, in both vol-
ume and value (Tacon 2003). Aquaculture can have many different types of
environmental effects, most of which researchers have been aware of for more than
20 years (Black 2001). The intention of this work is to analyse how different types
of aquaculture externalities can affect open-access and sole-owner fisheries. A very
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general model is developed to grasp the most important qualitative effects. It can be
used for a multitude of externality types. I consider externalities on either wild fish
growth dynamics or fishing operations. Effects on growth dynamics are modelled by
letting the area’s carrying capacity for the fish stock, or the stock’s intrinsic growth
rate, depend on aquaculture production volume. Effects on fishing operations are
modelled by letting the efficiency of fishing effort depend on aquaculture. To the
best of my knowledge, no one has previously analysed aquaculture externalities on
the intrinsic growth rate or fishing effort efficiency. I assume that conflicts between
the industries are local, and that no significant market interactions exist between the
actors. My model has fish population dynamics and production based on the classic
Verhulst-Schaefer fisheries model (Clark 1990). Only stock size, the area’s carrying
capacity, and the intrinsic growth rate of the species determine stock growth in my
model. I consider effects on fishing effort, fish stock size, wild fish yield, and rents
in steady state.
While the two externalities on growth dynamics give similar results on steady-
state fishing effort, fish stock levels, and yield, the externality on fishing effort
efficiency gives the opposite effects in most cases, even if all the three externalities
are negative. Being certain about what type of externality aquaculture will have on a
fishery is important for coastal managers.
I also consider how different coastal management regimes affect the allocation
of resources between the industries: (1) areas are practically unregulated, with ma-
rine farmers setting up their operations without regard to local fisheries, or having
been given a primary right of use; (2) a social planner maximises overall profits
through joint management of aquaculture and fisheries; (3) fishermen have an “his-
torical” right to an area and can decide whether, or to what extent, marine farming
can be established. The last regime also includes a situation where fishers can de-
mand compensation from marine farmers when there are negative external effects.
Case (3) is inspired by the situation in Japan (Murai 1992) and New Zealand
(Gibbs and Woods 2003). In Japan, fisheries cooperatives are given the rights to ar-
eas, and anyone wanting to establish a marine farm must get their permission. Since
2005, fishers in New Zealand have had the primary right to ocean areas when (pro-
spective) marine farmers want access. In neither case is payment for access
mentioned in the legislation, but not ruled out as far as I know. I investigate what is
likely to take place where one group has been given a primary right to an area, but
new stakeholders are pressing for access.
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section, I review possible types
of interactions between aquaculture and fisheries, and economic analyses of such in-
teractions, before I discuss how to model some types of aquaculture-externalities on
fisheries. The model is presented in the third section, first with a carrying capacity
externality and then the variants where the intrinsic growth rate and catchability is
affected, respectively. The last section contains the discussion and conclusions.
Interactions between Aquaculture and Fisheries
Aquaculture comes in many forms: freshwater ponds or pens, marine cages where
the whole life cycle is controlled, and salmon ranching where only the primary
stages of fish life are controlled before juveniles are released to the ocean and
caught when they return as adults to spawn (Naylor et al. 2000; Tacon 2003). An im-
portant distinction is between species like mussels, which use nutrients and food
naturally in the water, and carnivores like finfish that require feeding. Naturally,
with this diversity the effects of aquaculture on the environment, fisheries, and other
stakeholders, vary considerably.Aquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 289
Interactions between aquaculture and fisheries may be said to be of four differ-
ent classes: 1) effects through impact on the physical, chemical, or ecological
environment, including those that affect the genetics of populations; 2) direct effects
on costs or productivity; 3) interactions through related product markets; 4)
aquaculture’s demand for feed may affect fishing pressure on fish used in feed pro-
duction (Black 2001; Cole 2002; Milewski 2001; Naylor et al. 2000; ICES 2005).
An overview of interactions is provided, starting with the general literature on
classes 1) and 2), and then goes on to the economics literature. As we shall see, the
economics literature has focused on interactions 2) through 4), as many models in-
clude more than one type of interaction. Only one paper that I am aware of
considers the type 1) interaction. I then discuss how one can model interactions of
types 1) and 2), using the perhaps most widely used bioeconomic fisheries model as
a starting point. This justifies the model presented in the next section.
Aquaculture can influence the physical or chemical environment in its vicinity,
and this may affect fish populations directly or indirectly as well as positively or
negatively. Farmed shellfish can compete with other species for nutrients, oxygen,
and available sunlight in the water body. This may obviously bring about ecological
effects (Milewski 2001). Pearson and Black (2001) give an overview of major envi-
ronmental impacts of marine fish cage culture. They include impacts due to
enrichment of the environment, transferral of pests and diseases, and ecological im-
pacts of escaped fish that are exotic to a region, but still manage to reproduce. More
subtle effects are also possible. Some authors have reported lab experiments where
coastal cod flee tanks with water in which farmed cod or salmon have been (Saether,
Bjorn, and Dale 2007; Bjørn et al. 2007). This indicates that fishermen’s claims of
cod fleeing old spawning grounds after salmon farming started in the vicinity could
be correct. However, Bjørn et al. (2007) also observed how cod can be attracted to
farming pens in the field.
Genetic impacts on a wild fish stock may occur if farmed fish escape and breed
with wild fish. An example is salmon. The reproductive fitness in escaped fish is
lower than in native fish, but as the stock of farmed fish is much higher than wild
stocks in many areas (e.g., Norway), even relatively small fractional escape rates
from farms may have significant impact on wild stocks (Youngson et al. 2001). Es-
capes are substantial in some areas. In the period 1989–95, escaped salmon from
farms comprised, on average, from 21% to 38% of the fish in spawning stocks in
some Norwegian salmon rivers (Lund, Ostborg, and Hansen 1996, quoted in
Youngson et al. 2001).
Interbreeding between aquaculture escapees and wild populations poses two
hazards (Kapuscinski and Brister 2001). In the short run, the fitness and productiv-
ity of the wild fish might be reduced by outbreeding depression, giving a loss of
local adaptation. This is because maladaptive genes from farmed fish enter the wild
population, and coadapted gene-complexes that have evolved over time may be dis-
rupted. Kapuscinski and Brister (2001) refer to studies on trout, salmon, and
largemouth bass that investigate the effects of interbreeding between wild and do-
mesticated populations. The studies show that “interbreeding […] seldom improves
performance of fish in natural environments.” This is found to be due to lower sur-
vival from hatching, less fright response in fry, poorer innate predator avoidance,
and changes in aggressive behaviour. While the first three clearly reduce birth rates
and increase mortality rates, either increased or decreased aggression could reduce
fitness in the wild.
In the long run, genetic variability between natural populations might be re-
duced if aquaculture escapees, with little genetic variability, interbreed with several
wild populations. This might reduce the long-term sustainability of the wild popula-
tions, as it makes them simultaneously more vulnerable to environmental change.Mikkelsen 290
One might expect that the genes of escaped farmed fish would be quickly purged
from natural populations due to their maladaptation. Kapuscinski and Brister (2001)
argue against this. They write, “virtually no aquacultural broodstocks have become
so intensively domesticated as to assure a high death rate in the wild, and thus, rapid
purging of maladaptive genes.” Repeated escapes of farmed fish will also counter
the ability of natural selection to purge wild populations of maladaptive traits from
farmed fish.
Rather than affecting the marine environment and fish ecology, aquaculture ac-
tivities may affect fishing operations. This could be on both costs and productivity
of fishing. That aquaculture structures may displace fishing activities is suggested in
Cole (2002), ICES (2002), and in several works cited in Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-
Powell (2003). In a report for the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries, mapping
conflicts over the use of areas in the coastal zone, 26% of respondents answered that
the main reason for conflicts between aquaculture and fisheries were fishermen be-
ing hindered in trawling or placing nets (Anon. 2002). The answers came from
regional and national representatives of fish farmers and fishermen’s organisations,
as well as the Fisheries Directorate (state agency for both fishing and aquaculture in
Norway). Further, 31% of them stated that marine farms located on or near net pen
sites (for temporarily live storage of fish), or positions for setting nets, were the
main reasons for conflicts. Fishing is not possible right where marine farms are, but
the areas actually barred for other users can be much larger due to safety areas
around the farms (Maurstad 2002). Due to fisheries concerns, marine farms are
sometimes forced to accept other locations than their first choice. This may increase
production costs and/or lower productivity.
Now let us turn to economic papers analyzing aquaculture-fisheries interactions.
Anderson (1985a) considers salmon ranching and conflicts with commercial fisher-
ies. In sea ranching, fish are released into the ocean for growth after initial
aquacultural upbringing. If it is not possible to limit access to the fish, fishermen
who harvest the released fish constitute an externality to the ranchers. Anderson and
Wilen (1986) consider the strategic behaviour of a dominant salmon rancher facing a
competitive, open-access fishery and possibly also public hatcheries releasing
salmon smolt. They use dynamic nonlinear programming, but the basic model shares
major features with Anderson’s (1985a) model.
Anderson (1985b) analyses the market interaction between an open-access fish-
ery and aquaculture. Ye and Beddington (1996) build on Anderson’s work (1985b) to
analyse market interactions with dynamic models. Phuong and Gopalakrishnan
(2004) also study a dynamic market interaction between fisheries and aquaculture,
with the complicating factor of individual aquaculture production plants polluting
the water used by them and other aquaculture production plants. The fish stock is
assumed unaffected by the pollution from aquaculture.
When farmed fish are given feed made with their natural prey, aquaculture indi-
rectly affects the fisheries for the same species as is being farmed. In this setting
Hannesson (2003) considers if aquaculture can increase the total supply of fish for
human consumption. Asche and Tveterås (2004) discuss under which fisheries man-
agement regimes expansion of aquaculture could have a negative impact on fish
stocks by using feed from reduction fisheries. They also investigate whether the
market for fishmeal is part of the larger market for oilmeals, since this will deter-
mine if expansion of aquaculture using fishmeal can affect fishmeal prices
noticeably.
None of the papers above includes direct effects from aquaculture operations on
fish habitat or ecological effects on fish populations, nor do they have direct effects
on fishing operations. The only economics paper, of which I am aware, that includes
any of this, is Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell (2003). The authors assume thatAquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 291
aquaculture operations affect an area’s carrying capacity for a wild fish stock. They
first investigate effects of this on an open-access fishery, then a fishery optimally
managed by individual quotas, and finally when aquaculture and the fishery com-
pete in the product market. In the first two cases, they show how a negative effect
on carrying capacity reduces the fishing effort or the value of quota in steady state.
Fishermen will oppose establishment or expansion of aquaculture in both cases. In
the last case, they look for the optimal scale of aquaculture and fishing in an ocean
area using optimal control theory. Aquaculture production and costs are assumed
proportional to the area used, and expanding that area is costly. The authors assume
that the two industries make the same product and share the total market for it.
Characterising and analysing optimal steady-state outcomes, most of their compara-
tive statics findings are as expected. However, Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell find
that to maximise joint profits, more area should be allocated to aquaculture if the
unit cost of aquaculture production increases.
When investigating the possible effects of aquaculture on fisheries, it is reason-
able to start with simple, common models of both fish population dynamics and
harvest. The logistic biomass growth-function of Verhulst and the Schaefer harvest
function are simple and widely used, making them good starting points despite their
limitations (Clark 1990).
Although there are some models of the environmental effects of aquaculture,
very few exist where the secondary effects have been quantified (say, how nutrient
release translates into enhanced primary production) (Silvert and Cromey 2001).
Literature that tries to quantify the external effects into fish population dynamics or
economic performance is hard to come by. Gibbs (2004) is an exception, presenting
a very crude model for making such quantifications. Models predicting qualitative
effects of aquaculture on fisheries are really the best that can be achieved at present.
In theoretical ecology, the carrying capacity K is usually attributed to the envi-
ronment in which an organism or population lives (May 1981). It incorporates
nutrient supply, temperature, and the levels of competition and predation. The intrin-
sic growth rate r of an organism or population is attributed to the biology of that
organism or population itself. It constitutes a theoretical maximal rate of growth in
an ideal environment. Both changes in K and r will affect a population’s actual rate
of growth at different population sizes. However, the equilibrium size of an undis-
turbed population is entirely determined by K, while the dynamics, the response to
disturbances, depends also on r. It is therefore interesting to consider external ef-
fects from aquaculture on both of these, even though a dynamic analysis is not
presented here.
If aquaculture affects the environment in which a fish population lives, it seems
reasonable to model the effects as changes in the environment’s carrying capacity. If
escapees from aquaculture crossbreed and influence the genetic composition of a
wild population, affecting birth and mortality rates, and thus fitness and productiv-
ity, it is probably better to model this as a change in the population’s intrinsic
growth rate. When fishing operations are affected by aquaculture, this is modelled as
an effect on the catchability coefficient of the Schaefer harvest function. The harvest
function links stock size and fishing effort to harvest levels.
If fishing is barred from an area due to the establishment of aquaculture, but
fish remain inside the area, the aquaculture area can be viewed as a sort of nature
reserve or marine protected area (MPA) regarding the fish. MPAs have recently re-
ceived considerable attention in economics literature (Flaaten and Mjølhus 2005).
The size of an MPA, and the migration rate between the MPA and the harvest zone,
are central for the effects of the MPA on yield, stock size, and optimal effort level.
Using an MPA approach is warranted only if the area that fishing is barred from due
to aquaculture is of a considerable size. I have assumed that the total area of aquac-Mikkelsen 292
ulture farms, or the form or size of individual farms, is such that an MPA-like ap-
proach is not necessary.
The Model
The Verhulst-Schaefer fisheries model is coupled with a simple model of aquacul-
ture production to investigate effects of aquaculture on a wild fishery.
Aquaculture-fisheries interactions are examined within a limited geographical area
assuming aquaculture and fisheries co-exist in a region, and conflicts between them
are only local. I assume there is only one (prospective) marine farmer, ignoring is-
sues of entry and exit. The fishery is analysed as either open access or sole
ownership. The management area is assumed to correspond to the habitat for the fish
stock. I presume that the distribution of fish is unaffected by aquaculture activities.
The actors, which are assumed small compared to the market, take prices of factors
and products as given, and I examine them only at steady state. The external effects
from aquaculture on fisheries depend directly on aquaculture production volume.
Before looking at the model combining aquaculture and fisheries, aquaculture
alone is examined.
Aquaculture
Rents in aquaculture is πa = paS – vS2, where S is volume produced, pa is the price
received per unit of the farmed product, and v is a cost coefficient (v > 0). Margin-
ally increasing costs are expected if farm localities of lower quality must be used to
expand production. In addition, when the cage density increases, more diseases and
parasites are likely.
If pa – 2vS > 0 for all possible values of S, the marine farmer would likely use
the whole available area for farming. For an interior solution, the value of S that
maximises rents is Sa
* = pa/2v. This gives a maximal rent in aquaculture of πa
* = pa
2/4v.
Model K—Carrying Capacity Externality
In this model, an area’s carrying capacity for fish is reduced due to aquaculture. Al-
though a positive effect on carrying capacity is also possible, for ease of
presentation I consider only a negative externality. Compared to the basic Verhulst















Here, r is the intrinsic growth rate of the stock x, K0 – ϕS is the effective carrying
capacity, with K0 the “natural” carrying capacity and ϕ the coefficient of sensitivity
by which aquaculture production S influences the effective carrying capacity. K0 –
ϕS > 0 must be valid for all S. A linear relationship between S and effective carrying
capacity is likely to be a major simplification in most cases. This variant has the
same form on the externality as in Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell (2003).
The harvest rate is h = qEx, where E is fishing effort and q the catchability coef-Aquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 293
ficient. Under the assumption that aquaculture only forces fish from their habitat to
a negligible extent, aquaculture’s impact on fish density will be proportional to its
effect on the fish stock size through the carrying capacity. The Schaefer harvest
function can then be used. Net growth rate of the fish stock G(x) is then natural
growth minus harvest: G(x) = F(x) – h. In steady state, natural growth of the fish
stock equals harvest. Steady-state stock as a function of fishing effort is then given
by  x  = (K0 – ϕS)(1 – qE/r). Higher aquaculture production S gives a lower steady-
state stock for a given level of fishing effort E (remember a negative externality is
assumed; ϕ > 0).
Assuming constant unit cost c of fishing effort and a constant product price pf of
wild fish, the rent in fishing is πf (x,E) = pf qEx – cE. Using the steady-state stock
equation gives an expression of steady-state rents depending on fishing effort E and
aquaculture production volume S:
πϕ ff xE E pqK S E
qE
r









I am now in a position to consider the effects of different management regimes
for the area including the fishery. A case where aquaculture is given some sort of
primary right to decide its level of operation is considered first. Fishermen must
adapt to the marine farmer’s choices, but they are allowed to use the area not used
for aquaculture. This is contrasted to the case where a social planner decides both
aquaculture production volume and fishing effort. In the last case, a fisherman (or
cooperative of fishermen) is given the primary right to the area, and anyone inter-
ested in starting up aquaculture must get permission from the fisherman. The
possibility of payment for access is opened up in the latter case.
Marine Farmer has Primary Right of Access
Under open-access, the steady-state rents from fishing will be zero. This is the same
as assuming that average revenue equals average cost. Equation (2) can then be





















Clearly, increased aquaculture production reduces the steady-state effort level (pro-
vided pf q(K0 – ϕS) – c > 0). This is the condition for starting fishing on a fish stock
at its maximum carrying capacity level, and it is assumed fulfilled. This effort level

























As usual, the steady-state stock level is independent of the carrying capacity,
and in this case it is also independent of aquaculture production. The sustainable
yield goes down when aquaculture production is increased.






















As expected E* = E∞/2, and rent-maximising effort is reduced when effective carry-
ing capacity (K0 – ϕS) is reduced. The rent-maximising steady-state stock x*, yield





































































The steady-state stock level is falling with increasing aquaculture production S.1
Maximal rents in fisheries fall with increasing S. The sustainable yield falls with in-
creased aquaculture production. If aquaculture production increases, the effect on the
maximal rents in fisheries is always negative, but the marginal effect is diminishing.
Social Planner
Real-life social planners usually consider an array of objectives, and must strike a
compromise. Typical objectives are ecological sustainability or maximising rents,
employment, or protein supply. Here, I simply assume that the social planner’s ob-
jective is to maximise joint rents R from fisheries and aquaculture. Given the
specifications above, this means to maximise R by choosing S and E, or choosing S
to maximise πa(S) + πf
*(S) [πf
*(S) is (9)]. If dπa/dS + dπf
*/dS > 0 for all S, the entire
available area should be devoted to aquaculture. If it is <0 for all S, only fishing
should take place. The condition for an interior solution is:
pv S





















1 It corresponds to expression (4) in Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell (2003), assuming zero discount rate.Aquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 295
Fulfilment of the second-order condition depends on parameter values in a way
that is not easily interpreted. Solving equation (10) wrt S gives three roots, of which
only one is real. Analytical interpretation of the real root is not meaningful.2 What is
clear is that the aquaculture production level that maximises joint rents is smaller
than what would maximise rents in aquaculture alone. The former takes into consid-
eration that aquaculture has a negative effect on rents in the fishery. The
comparative statics results are as expected: dS/dc > 0, dS/dpa > 0, dS/dpf < 0, dS/dv <
0, and dS/dϕ < 0. Note that dS/dv < 0. This is opposite of what Hoagland, Jin, and
Kite-Powell (2003) found with their model: if the cost parameter in aquaculture in-
creases, aquaculture production should be increased to maximise overall profits.
They explain, “…the dynamic marginal cost of aquaculture is reduced through an
expansion of [aquaculture area]” (aquaculture production is proportional to the
aquaculture area in their model). In my model, there are no dynamic effects, and this
could be the reason why the results differ.
Fisher as “Primary Rights-Holder” with Tradable Rights
If a fisher or cooperative of fishermen has the primary right to an area, as is the case
in some places, prospective marine farmers must ask permission before starting
aquaculture. If negative externalities on the fishery are expected from aquaculture,
the fisher will likely refuse the marine farmer access to the area, unless something
can tip the balance. The fisher may demand that the marine farmer pay for using part
of the ocean area, compensating him for negative external effects. To analyse this
latter alternative, the rent functions must be altered to incorporate costs (for the
farmer) and income (for the fisher) for the farmer’s access to the area. If we assume
payment per unit production in aquaculture:
πa
t
aa pt S v S = −− () 2 (11)
π f
t
ff p qEx cE t S = − + . (12)
πa
t and πf
t are the new rent functions for aquaculture and fishing, ta is the price
the marine farmer is considering paying the fisher for each unit produced, and tf is
the price the fisher is considering charging. A solution with both industries is only
present if ta ≥ tf. The first-order conditions for maximising rents wrt S are:














for the marine farmer and the fisher, respectively.
It is easy to see that when ta = tf , we have the same condition as when a social
planner maximises joint rents. Having a primary rights holder who can sell rights of
use further can realise the overall optimal solution if the actors are well informed.
2 Anyone interested can contact the author to get the expressions.Mikkelsen 296
Model r — Intrinsic Growth Rate Externality
Here it is assumed that the intrinsic growth rate r is negatively influenced by aquac-










⎟ 0 1 α (15)
where α is the coefficient of sensitivity by which S influences r (α > 0 for negative
externality), r0 is the natural intrinsic growth rate, and r0 – αS > 0 for all possible S.
All other relationships are as for model K. The steady-state results for the fishery are
as for model K, with r replaced by (r0 – αS) and (K0 – ϕS) replaced by K. The sign of
the marginal effects of a change in S are the same as in model K, except that x* is
unaffected by increased S here, but negatively affected in model K. This variant of
the model is the only one that gives a reasonably simple expression for aquaculture





























The second-order condition for this is always fulfilled (–2v < 0). All comparative
statics results are as expected. For the management regime where fishers have a primary
right to use the area, the results are also similar to model K’s, and as expected.
Model q — Catchability Externality
Aquaculture structures and operations might affect fishing operations directly, as
mentioned earlier. The fishing effort required to catch a given amount of fish could
change due to the establishment of aquaculture, independent of its impact on fish
stock size or density of fish. This is the situation in model q here. It is assumed that
the catchability coefficient in the harvest function is negatively impacted by aquac-
ulture production. Fishing effort can be viewed as a composite of several activities
related to actual fishing: preparing the vessel and gear for fishing, transport to and
from the fishing grounds, getting gear in and out of water, and actual fishing with
gear in the water. Although the efficiency of the gear while in the water may be un-
affected by marine farming, other fishing effort activities could be affected.











The harvest function is:
hq S E x = − () , 0 β (18)
where β is the coefficient of sensitivity by which S influences q (β > 0 for negative
externality), q0 is the “initial” catchability coefficient, and q0 – βS > 0 for all pos-Aquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 297
sible S. The steady-state results for the fishery follow readily from the other two
variants by just making the appropriate substitution of q with (q0 – βS). The expres-
sion for socially optimal aquaculture production is, again, not easily interpreted. The
second-order condition is always fulfilled if the stock level at open-access equilib-
rium is lower than the MSY-level (x∞  < xMSY).3 It can, however, be fulfilled also for
x∞  > xMSY, depending on parameter values.
The comparative statics analysis wrt aquaculture production S reveals large dif-
ferences compared with the other models. Increased S gives higher fishing effort
under both open access and sole ownership, and higher sustainable yield under open ac-
cess, given that x∞ < xMSY. This is likely the most common situation in exploited fisheries,
since world fisheries landings probably have been declining since the 1980s (Pauly et al.
2002). However for a biologically underutilized stock (x∞  > xMSY), the effects on ef-
fort and yield are the same as in model K. The effect of changed S on steady-state
stock is also different in model q. In models K and r, there are no effects on open-
access, steady-state stock, but in model q a higher production volume gives a larger
open-access, steady-state stock. In addition, increased S gives a larger steady-state
stock level if there is sole ownership, opposite the effects in model K and r.
These effects are explained in figure 1. Reduced q means lower catch for a
given fishing effort on a given stock size. Then, the stock grows. If x∞ < xMSY ini-
tially, this then gives increased equilibrium yield under open access. In the figure,
the steady-state total revenue curve is expanded horizontally with reduced q, and ar-
rows indicate the move to new equilibria. If the reduction in q should bring the
open-access equilibrium point far enough above the point corresponding to the MSY
stock level, the equilibrium yield under open-access would decrease. In the rent-
maximising case, the yield always decreases if q is reduced. Under both open-access
and rent maximisation, equilibrium effort goes up when aquaculture production in-
creases, as long as x∞ < xMSY. While total revenues increase under open access, they
are offset by the cost of extra effort.4 For a sole owner, effort and total costs increase
while total revenues decrease. Clearly then, rents must be reduced.
For the socially optimal production volume in aquaculture, the first order-condi-
tion for an interior solution here is:
pv S



















The expression for the optimal aquaculture production is not easily interpreted.
Comparative statics wrt parameters, however, yield interesting results for changes in


























3 MSY stock larger than open-access, steady-state stock is the same as the condition K/2 > c/[pf (q –
βS)], or equivalently pf (q – βS)K – 2c < 0. This decides the sign of e.g., dE∞/dS = {–rβ[pf (q – βS)K –
2c]}/(pf (q – βS)3K).
4 To some extent, the results here resemble those in Anderson (1985b). In his model of a competitive
aquaculture industry entering the market of fish from an open-access fishery, it also leads to higher fish
stock and yield in equilibrium, provided x∞ < xMSY. However, in his model this is due to a reduction in
price, not reduced catchability. Further, in his model effort goes down while yields go up. In my model,
both effort and yield increase.Mikkelsen 298
Figure 1.  Steady-state Total Revenues (TR) and Total Costs (TC)
in the Fishery as a Function of Fishing Effort (E), when the
Catchability Coefficient is reduced due to Aquaculture
Note: Solid dots indicate open access; white dots, rent maximisation. Numbers are
from a hypothetical example with these parameter values: r=0.5, pf=1, q0=0.1,
K=100, c=3, β=0.001, S=0, and S=30.
We see that dS/dc < 0 when x∞ < xMSY. If the unit cost of fishing effort increases, a
social planner should decrease aquaculture production in order to maximise joint
rents from aquaculture and fisheries. This immediately seems to run counter to intu-
ition; if fishing becomes more costly, aquaculture should expand. However, when
the first-order condition (19) is fulfilled and the unit cost of fishing effort c in-
creases, dπf
*/dS is reduced. S should then be reduced in order to increase (pa – 2vS)
and dπf
*/dS, until the first-order condition again is fulfilled. The effect of the opti-
mal adjustment in S is to provide a smaller reduction in fishing effort, relatively
higher revenues, and higher total costs, but overall a smaller reduction in fishing
rents than without the adjustment in S. Of course, with higher c, fishing rents will
always be reduced.
The other comparative statics results for the case of rent maximisation in model
q are as expected. When a fisher has a primary right to the area, again the socially
optimal solution can be realised given that he/she can lease the right to farm fish out
against compensation.Aquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 299
Discussion and Conclusions
Three variants of a model of aquaculture externalities on fisheries have been pre-
sented. Two variants of the model have an ecological effect of aquaculture on the
wild fish population, affecting either the habitat’s carrying capacity for a fish stock
or the intrinsic growth rate of that fish stock. In the third variant, aquaculture affects
fishing operations, technically by affecting the catchability coefficient of the harvest
function. Previous work has looked at combined market and ecological interactions
between aquaculture and fisheries. My model has no market interaction. This setting
should be relevant when conflicts are local in nature and actors small, taking prices
as given.
I find that the different externality types can provide very different effects on
fishing effort, yield, and steady-state stock; in some cases depending on whether the
fishery is open access or sole ownership. If the management authority of a coastal
area assumes aquaculture impacts negatively on the growth of wild fish, while it ac-
tually reduces fishing efficiency, it could be very surprised by the effects on fish
stock and yield. These results should be of relevance to managers of coastal areas.
In my model, a negative externality from aquaculture on an area’s carrying ca-
pacity, or on the intrinsic growth rate of a fish population, will give reduced fishing
effort and yield in steady state for both an open access and a sole owner fishery.
Steady-state stocks are either unaffected or reduced. If aquaculture production low-
ers fishing efficiency, it always gives larger steady-state stocks for both open-access
and sole owner fisheries, and it always gives lower sustainable yield for a sole
owner fishery. All three types of negative externalities described here give reduced
rents in equilibrium in an optimally managed fishery.
In table 1, the steady-state effects of increased aquaculture production in the
three variants of the model are summed up, wrt fishing effort, stock, yield, and
rents.
The table shows that the sign of dE∞/dS in model K is negative. The most strik-
ing is the positive effects in model q of increased S on fishing effort and stock
levels, as well as on yield in the open-access case (when x∞ < xMSY), while the other
two variants have no or opposite effect of increased S on the same variables. That
the apparently negative effect of aquaculture on fishing in model q actually gives a
positive effect on open-access equilibrium stock, yield, and effort is not surprising.
Reducing q is comparable to restricting the use of effective fishing gear. This mea-
sure is used to regulate open-access fisheries for higher stocks and yields.
A positive externality of aquaculture on an area’s carrying capacity for a fish
stock is possible, at least for some types of fish farming in some environments. This
would, of course, give opposite effects for model K, referred to above. Aquaculture
production can affect a single fishery in several, or even all, of the ways analysed
Table 1
Comparative Statics (sign of derivatives) of Increased S in Models K, r,
and q for both Open-Access (∞) and Sole Ownership (*) Cases
E∞ x∞ Y∞ E* x* Y* πf
*
Model K –0 –––––
Model r –0 ––0––
Model q +a ++ a +a +––
a Sign if x∞ < xMSY. If x∞ > xMSY, the derivative is negative.Mikkelsen 300
here. There could even be a positive externality on carrying capacity, but a negative
one on catchability. Then both types of externality, sign, and magnitude would mat-
ter when allocating between industries.
Different coastal management regimes can affect the tradeoff between aquacul-
ture and fishing activities. If marine farmers can set their production level without
regard to a negative externality on fisheries, they will choose a production volume
too high compared to the socially optimal level. A social planner would consider the
negative externality and make marine farmers produce less in order to maximise
overall rents from the two industries. Inspired by the situation in Japan and New
Zealand, I have investigated outcomes if a fisher has the primary right to use the
ocean area, but may give other users access, possibly against compensation. If there
is a negative externality from aquaculture, the fisher has no incentive to allow farm-
ing, unless compensation is offered. With a tradable right that can be leased or
rented from the fisher (the rights holder) to farmers, the optimal solution can be
realised if the actors are well informed. It is likely that marine farmers and fishers
know the external effects between them better than the authorities. In New Zealand,
groups of fishermen decide together whether marine farming will be allowed within
a coastal area, and there may be several prospective marine farmers. Only the case
with one fisher and one prospective farmer has been examined.
In my model, I assumed that the distribution of fish is unaffected by marine
farming, and that the Schaefer harvest function can be used. Marine aquaculture
necessarily occupies some ocean space, both surface area and a volume below the
surface. The total area available for fishing must be reduced, but the area used for
fishing could be unchanged. Likewise, the actual habitat for fish could be un-
changed or reduced due to aquaculture. In addition to the physical structures,
operation of the farm and any safety zone around it matters, as does the type of fish
(e.g., demersal or (semi-)pelagic, schooling or not) and the form of the ocean space
occupied by aquaculture. The assumption that the distribution of fish is unaffected
by aquaculture activities can be reasonable if the aquaculture structures occupy a
negligible part of the total space available to fish. That is, they occupy a small por-
tion of the total area, have very limited depth in the water compared to the total
depth, or are not in the space used by the fish species in question. An example could
be a marine farm using only the top 10 m of a 50 m deep marine environment, and
only demersal fish species using the bottom 5–10 m live there.
Fish populations are usually not distributed uniformly over their habitat. Using
the Schaefer harvest function assumes that catch per unit effort (CPUE) is propor-
tional to stock size, and remains so for all levels of stock and fishing effort. Among
the central assumptions for this hypothesis are that the fish population is uniformly
distributed, that fishing gear is not saturated, and that vessels do not congest (Clark
1990). Implicitly it assumes that CPUE is proportional to fish density (Flaaten and
Mjølhus 2005). If the habitat size for fish changes due to aquaculture activities, this
would complicate the analysis considerably. If vessels congest, perhaps due to a re-
duced fishing area because of increased aquaculture structures, fishers would
experience decreasing marginal returns of fishing effort. In many real cases, aquac-
ulture structures may be located so that fishing operations are not affected at all, and
fish populations are only marginally affected.
In summary, I have presented a model to study the effects of several types of
external effects from aquaculture on wild fisheries, and I have considered how dif-
ferent coastal management regimes affect the allocation between the two industries.
The results should be of relevance to coastal managers. Assuming the wrong type of
external effect can give very surprising outcomes, even when all externalities are
taken to be “negative.” Giving one industry a primary right to use coastal areas will
normally not realise the socially optimal outcome, unless some sort of tradableAquaculture-Fisheries Interactions 301
rights scheme is possible. The model has several (at least potential) limitations,
among them the assumption that fish distribution is unaffected by aquaculture op-
erations. The properties and outcomes of a tradable rights scheme when a fisher has
primary rights to an area should also be investigated in a multi-actor setting.
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